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Nuclear issues have been grabbing the international headlines in recent 
months, amid renewed concern over the nuclear defiance of North Korea 
and Iran and the international community’s inability to mount an effective 
response. Onlookers could be forgiven for thinking that the nonproliferation 
regime is moribund where difficult cases are concerned: it has responded 
too little and too late to repeated provocations, diplomatic initiatives have so 
far failed, and ideas for implementing new, more effective punitive measures 
have petered out. In these circumstances, one can justifiably question why so 
much time and resources are committed to upholding the 1968 Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The answer is that even though it’s deeply flawed and the product of a 
bygone era, the NPT continues to play a crucial stabilising role in the 
international system. Most states believe a weak NPT’s better than none 
at all because, although the treaty hasn’t stopped the spread of nuclear 
weapons, it has significantly hindered proliferation. Moreover, it’s facilitated 
disarmament between states that were once engaged in dangerous nuclear 
arms races, and it continues to provide political momentum for nuclear 
reductions. Whatever their views on the ethics of nuclear possession, even 
the most ardent supporters of nuclear deterrence accept that preventing the 
uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons is a common good. That position is 
based on the logic that the more nuclear weapons there are, the more likely it 
is that they’ll be used again, whether by accident or intent.
Australia recognises the critical role that the NPT plays in preventing 
uncontrolled proliferation and promoting disarmament, and upholding the 
treaty has long been a core foreign policy goal. As Gary Quinlan, Australia’s 
permanent representative to the UN, stated recently, ‘Australia is always 
willing to do its share of the work to elevate the game and make the world 
more stable and secure, in order to save ourselves from ourselves.’1 But, 
while the record of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on this front 
is impressive, its disarmament diplomacy has hit a difficult patch and there’s a 
strong possibility that its current agenda will fail unless it’s adapted.
This paper examines Australia’s difficulties in this area, and proposes a 
way forward for the next government. It focuses primarily on the goals and 
activities of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), which 
was launched at the United Nations in September 2010. This diplomatic 
initiative has brought together the foreign ministers of Australia, Canada, 
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Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) in a campaign to bolster the NPT by promoting progress in 
nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation at a time when international tensions 
are rising, proliferation pressures are growing, and momentum for nuclear arms 
reductions is dissipating.2 In many ways, these developments make the role of 
the coalition more crucial than ever. But in order to have impact, the NPDI needs 
a realistic agenda that draws on the experience of its members, who in turn need 
to be seen to be sincerely committed to the goals they’re advocating. At the 
moment, it’s questionable whether that’s the case. The coalition needs to rethink its 
short-term goals and strategy.
The troubled NPT review process
Many states, including Australia, continue to invest significant diplomatic capital 
in upholding the NPT, including by investing in its review process. This is a 
complex and lengthy negotiation involving annual preparatory committee meetings 
(‘PrepComs’) and a five-yearly review conference, during which progress on 
implementing the NPT is assessed and steps to help strengthen the treaty are 
negotiated. The ultimate goal of these meetings is to keep the treaty relevant 
as the strategic environment changes, while holding states to their original 
NPT commitments.
The nuclear-weapon states (NWS: China, France, Russia, the UK and the US):3
•	 promise not to proliferate to third parties
•	 agree to assist states in the development of nuclear technology for peaceful 
uses
•	 commit to work in good faith towards nuclear elimination, and to help create the 
conditions that will make this possible.
The non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS: all other NPT signatories):4
•	 promise not to develop nuclear weapons
•	 agree not to assist other states in developing nuclear weapons
•	 pledge to help create strategic and political conditions that are more conducive 
to nuclear disarmament.
The appendix to this paper summarises NPT negotiations, which are often 
divided between different constituencies, especially the NWS and a large group 
of NNWS that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement (the NAM—a group 
of 120 developing states).5 The NWS complain that many NAM members fail 
to acknowledge the disarmament steps that they’ve taken, or the technical, 
political and strategic obstacles that hinder nuclear elimination. They also express 
frustration that many NAM states do little to help create conditions that would be 
more conducive to disarmament, including by failing to exert pressure on NAM 
members that have refused to join the treaty, withdrawn from it, or are violating 
the treaty from within. For their part, NAM members bemoan the double standards 
inherent in the nonproliferation regime—for example, they’re highly critical of the 
US’s failure to address Israel’s nuclear weapons program and NPT holdout status, 
and are concerned that their own nonproliferation obligations are becoming more 
burdensome while the prospect of a nuclear-weapon-free world is becoming 
more remote.
Given these deep and longstanding divisions, it might seem remarkable that 
consensus is ever achieved at NPT review conferences. Yet, as the appendix 
shows, most NPT meetings have produced a consensus final document. Moreover, 
lack of a consensus outcome at one meeting hasn’t necessarily spelled disaster 
for the next. Many experts and practitioners believe that this owes a great deal to 
the diplomatic efforts of disarmament coalitions, which have helped build bridges 
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across NPT chasms, encouraging divided constituencies to find areas where they’re 
prepared to be flexible and compromise.6
Australia as an NPT bridge-builder
Australia has played an energetic role in the NPT bridge-building process. With 
the help of like-minded states, it has championed the treaty by placing both 
nonproliferation and disarmament firmly on the international agenda, inside and 
outside the UN. In launching the Canberra Commission in 1995, it was the first 
state to explicitly call for a serious and in-depth study of the consequences of 
nuclear weapons proliferation and the prospects for their elimination. Thanks to that 
initiative and subsequent related activities, Australia’s gained a reputation among 
many states as a moderate nonproliferation and disarmament leader in international 
forums—a state that accepts that the security concerns of the NWS need to be 
addressed in any disarmament steps, emphasises the key role that norms and 
regulatory institutions play in creating conditions that are more conducive to 
disarmament, and has consistently called for phased, balanced and verifiable 
progress towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.
Australia has played a central role in state-sponsored nonproliferation and 
disarmament initiatives, having led and participated in more of those activities than 
any other state (Table 1).
Table 1: State-sponsored non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives
Date Initiative Membership Activity
1995–96 Canberra 
Commission
Australia plus 
17 international 
commissioners
Study of utility of nuclear weapons 
and feasibility of disarmament
1998–99 Tokyo Forum Japan plus NGOs Study of proliferation dangers and 
disarmament feasibility
1998–99 Canada and 
the Nuclear 
Challenge
Canada, Joint Standing 
Committee
State-sponsored review of Canada’s 
nuclear policies
1998–ongoing New Agenda 
Coalition
Ireland plus Brazil, Egypt, 
Mexico, New Zealand, 
South Africa, Sweden
Diplomatic coalition proposing 
practical steps towards disarmament 
in NPT review process
2004–09 Blix 
Commission
Sweden plus NGOs 
and 14 international 
commissioners
State-sponsored study of WMD 
dangers and prospects for their 
elimination
2005–10 Seven Nation 
Initiative
Norway plus Australia, 
Chile, Indonesia, 
Romania, South Africa, 
UK
Diplomatic coalition promoting 
technical cooperation and research 
on nonproliferation and disarmament
2008–10 International 
Commission 
on Nuclear 
Non-
Proliferation 
and 
Disarmament 
(ICNND)a
Australia and Japan 
plus 15 international 
commissioners
State-sponsored initiative 
exploring practical measures for 
nonproliferation and disarmament
2010–ongoing NPDI Australia and Japan plus 
Canada, Chile, Germany, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates
Diplomatic coalition to advance 
implementation of disarmament 
steps in NPT review process 
a  The Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which is based at the Australian 
National University, has grown from this initiative. The centre is funded primarily by the Australian 
Government,and its international advisory board consists of the former members of the ICNND. 
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The NPDI is Australia’s most recent contribution to the NPT review process. The 
foreign ministers of the NPDI coalition’s 10 member countries have stated that 
nuclear weapons pose a grave threat to humanity and have expressed deep 
concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon use.7 
From this common ethics-based standpoint, they’ve committed themselves to work 
together to reduce nuclear risks and promote a world without nuclear weapons.8
Above all else, the NPDI is urging states to uphold the promises that they made at 
the successful 2010 NPT Review Conference, which produced a consensus final 
document and ‘Disarmament Action Plan’. This included commitments by the NWS 
to make progress in eight key areas:
•	 reductions in numbers of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons
•	 a diminished role for nuclear weapons in security strategies
•	 reductions in the operational status of nuclear weapons
•	 the application of the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency to 
the nuclear disarmament process
•	 early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
•	 immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiation of a Fissile 
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
•	 the convening of a conference on establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle 
East (now known as the Helsinki Conference)
•	 the adoption by the NWS of a common and high standard of transparency over 
their nuclear status.
Since its 2010 launch, NPDI disarmament diplomacy has focused on encouraging 
progress in these areas, while at the same time stressing the linkages between 
disarmament and nonproliferation. The NPDI has met annually at the UN First 
Committee in September in New York, and held ministerial meetings in Berlin in 
April 2011, Istanbul in June 2012, and The Hague in April 2013. It issued joint 
statements at the NPT PrepComs in Vienna in May 2012 and Geneva in April 
2013, where it also submitted working papers for discussion in the substantive 
debates, and held a series of outreach events to engage civil society. Combined, 
the coalition’s statements and activities during its initial period of operation provide 
insight into its strategy: to build consensus in the lead-up to the 2015 Review 
Conference on the need to prevent nuclear weapon use, whether it occurs as a 
result of conflict escalation, accident or terrorist attack, and to encourage states to 
take practical steps that will make it less likely.
Problems with the NPDI agenda
Despite the NPDI coalition’s legitimate goals and good intentions, parts of its 
agenda are weak and its impact is likely to be marginal at best. Most significantly, 
a series of events that are beyond its control has made a successful review 
conference in 2015 an extremely distant prospect. The coalition isn’t responsible 
for those events, but they’ll nonetheless undermine its influence, particularly if it 
continues to pursue a bridge-building strategy aimed at achieving consensus.
For the NAM, the most important development has been the indefinite 
postponement of the Helsinki Conference, which was supposed to begin 
discussions on the creation of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. The 
postponement, in December 2012, has provoked frustration and discontent among 
many NAM members, some of which are arguing that they should be released 
from the nonproliferation commitments they made in 2010.9 Iran’s chairmanship 
of the NAM from 2012 to 2015 (taking over from Egypt) is likely to exacerbate 
this problem, making NAM flexibility on disarmament even less likely in 2015.10 
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Compounding these developments, the strategic context has become more difficult 
and complex than it was in 2010: power shifts to the East, live territorial disputes, 
a downturn in great-power relations, and nuclear defiance by North Korea and Iran 
have all put the brakes on disarmament momentum. These developments are sure 
to undermine President Obama’s disarmament agenda in his second term, which in 
turn will further erode the optimism and positive atmosphere that the US was able 
to generate in 2010.11
In addition to the increasingly difficult international context and strategic 
environment, the NPDI coalition’s activities and statements are perceived 
by many as lacking sincerity, which is also problematic. Those perceptions 
are mainly due to the composition of the group; although it’s diverse in some 
respects, it mainly comprises US allies that rely on US extended deterrence 
through either bilateral defence arrangements (Australia, Canada and Japan) or 
NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements (Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and 
Turkey). These deterrence arrangements put these seven states in an ambiguous 
position regarding nonproliferation and disarmament norms, leading some to 
question both the credibility of their stated goals and their capacity to perform a 
bridge-building function.12
Figure 1: Nuclear umbrellas and nuclear-sharing arrangements
These criticisms can’t be easily dismissed or wished away—to some extent, they’re 
valid. Currently, about 180 US non-strategic nuclear bombs—the larger yield 
B61-Mod 3 and the smaller yield B61-Mod 4—are deployed in Europe. They’re 
deployed at air bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, 
where they contribute to NATO nuclear deterrence (Table 2).
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Table 2: US non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011 
Country Air base Dual capable aircraft Number of B-61s
Belgium Kleine Brogel Belgian F-16 10–20
Germany Büchel German Tornado 10–20
Italy Aviano
Ghedi Torre
US F-16
US F-16
50
10–20
Netherlands Volkel Dutch F-16 10–20
Turkey Incirlik US fighter aircraft 
(rotating)
60–70
Total 150–200
Source: RS Norrisand HM Kristensen 2011
Interestingly, nuclear strategists consider the current military value of these 
weapons to be poor because there are no targets within range of the aircraft 
that would carry them—the only airbase that’s within unrefuelled fighter bomber 
range of possible targets (Incirlik in southeast Turkey) doesn’t host nuclear 
capable fighter-bombers. However, the B61 Life Extension Program and the F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter (which is under development by the US, in partnership with 
Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Turkey and other countries) could change that 
situation by the end of this decade, boosting NATO nuclear capability by building 
the capacity for precision low-yield strikes across a range of targets, including 
underground facilities.
This upgrade of NATO non-strategic nuclear weapons is drawing criticism on two 
fronts. First, it isn’t consistent with the pledges made by states at recent NPT review 
conferences. In 2000, it was agreed by consensus that steps would be taken to 
‘diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that 
they will be used’.13 In 2010, it was agreed—again by consensus—to ‘diminish 
the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, 
doctrines and policies’.14 The B61 Life Extension Program isn’t compatible with 
those commitments for two reasons: first, the new B61-12 will have new and greater 
military capabilities than the weapons it replaces; second, the deployment of the 
new bomb to Europe may well reduce the nuclear threshold and increase the risk 
that nuclear weapons are used in war fighting (because the new weapons will be 
able to destroy targets with lower yield and less radioactive fallout).
Given these developments, it’s not surprising that the activities of some NPDI 
members appear insincere. It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that the coalition’s 
European members, in particular, want to have their cake and eat it. On one hand, 
their diplomats are presenting themselves as champions of nuclear nonproliferation 
and disarmament—a role that’s popular with their domestic constituencies.15 On the 
other hand, their defence establishments are deeply invested in the existing nuclear 
order, and appear to support or at least acquiesce in the development of new 
nuclear weapons with enhanced capabilities. Similar charges of insecurity have 
been levelled at Australia and Japan, which both provided the initial momentum 
for the launch of the NPDI but whose defence and foreign affairs officials appear 
to be pursuing conflicting agendas. Moreover, Australia’s nonproliferation and 
disarmament responsibilities extend beyond those of most NPT parties, Canberra 
having been the driving force behind the creation of the South Pacific Nuclear 
Weapon-Free Zone and party to the Rarotonga Treaty since the mid-1980s. Of the 
NPDI members, only Chile, Mexico and the United Arab Emirates can be said to 
have consistent non-nuclear credentials; the others occupy a murky grey area.
Having been a source of quiet debate in the corridors at the 2012 PrepCom, the 
NPDI’s ‘sincerity deficit’ became a more central concern in 2013. This was partly 
due to the high profile refusal of NPDI members, with the exception of Chile and 
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Mexico, to sign the Joint Statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, 
which was supported by 78 governments at the 2013 PrepCom.16 Revelations by 
senior Washington analysts at a side event on reducing the role of nuclear weapons 
highlighted the issue as well: they indicated that, in 2012, the Obama administration 
had considered a proposal to reduce the role of and numbers of US nuclear 
weapons much further than had been envisaged in the 2010 New Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty and Nuclear Posture Review, but ‘had been stymied by Japan and 
a few NATO allies’.17
Figure 2: Nuclear weapons-free zones
Given the combination of the difficult strategic environment and the perception 
that the NPDI lacks sincerity, the coalition needs to take special care about which 
issues it chooses to prioritise and how they’re addressed. Unfortunately, the 
coalition isn’t excelling in this respect—a working paper on transparency that it 
submitted during the 2012 PrepCom was its strongest contribution to date, but even 
that suffers from weaknesses.18 The coalition highlighted the point that, without 
transparency, suspicions among the NWS and NNWS over numbers of nuclear 
weapons, capabilities and doctrines will remain, and the trust and confidence 
needed to promote stability will be elusive. However, its solution to this problem—
the development of a standard reporting form, which it’s asking the NWS to adopt—
misses the mark. The form asks the NWS to list the number of nuclear warheads 
and delivery systems that remain in their stockpiles—deployed and undeployed, 
strategic and non-strategic—and to provide exact details of their nuclear reductions 
since 1995. It also asks them to provide details of their nuclear doctrines, their 
stocks of fissile materials, steps they’ve taken to reduce nuclear dangers (including 
the risk of nuclear accidents and unauthorised use), and all measures they’ve taken 
in support of nuclear disarmament.
While this is a valid request, its prospects for success aren’t good. The most 
stubborn holdouts are likely to be Russia and China, both of which are wary of 
the NPDI’s agenda because of the status of its members as US allies, most of 
which participate in controversial missile defence plans and in nuclear-sharing and 
extended deterrence relationships. On a strategic level, the fiercest resistance 
is likely to come from China, the NWS with the smallest and least sophisticated 
nuclear arsenal, and therefore the one with the least incentive to accept the 
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level of transparency that the NPDI is seeking. China currently regards some 
level of nuclear opacity—especially over its nuclear modernisation plans—as 
non-negotiable and is likely to ignore any pressure from the NPDI or the other NWS 
to conform to a high standard of nuclear transparency.
Perhaps surprisingly, the NPDI transparency initiative is also unlikely to attract 
the wholehearted support of France, the UK and the US—three states that have 
been much more transparent about their nuclear arsenals and doctrines in recent 
years and which have been calling for Russia and China to follow their lead. The 
NPDI might have overlooked the fact that the 2010 NPT Review Conference 
encouraged NWSs to negotiate among themselves on devising practical measures 
to implement their disarmament commitments, including over the issue of nuclear 
transparency. This has helped legitimise the P5 conference process (involving the 
five permanent members of the UN Security Council) that began in London in 2009 
and has continued since, allowing the NWS to close ranks on the transparency 
issue.19 Although officials claim that progress has been made during these quiet, 
closed-door discussions, including on the issue of reporting, they’ve expressed 
strong reservations about the NPDI standard reporting form.20 This doesn’t bode 
well for the NPDI agenda in the lead-up to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, 
especially given that the coalition’s capacity to exert pressure over this issue is 
extremely limited.
The NPDI transparency initiative mightn’t achieve its goal, but at least it has 
substance. The same can’t be said for other components of the NPDI agenda, 
the weakest of which are its 2012 and 2013 working papers on nonproliferation 
and disarmament education. The 2012 paper sets out a few basic principles of 
disarmament education, makes anodyne suggestions about the use of social media 
tools in education activities, and lists a few unimpressive unilateral initiatives that 
four of its members (Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and Poland) have launched 
since 2003. The 2013 paper reads like an afterthought, highlighting a couple of 
worthy initiatives by Japan and Mexico, but leaving the reader wondering about 
the efforts being made by the other eight NPDI members. Together, these are 
disappointing offerings, which give the impression of having been cobbled together 
by officials with next to no knowledge of—or even interest in—nonproliferation 
and disarmament education. They miss an opportunity to present far-reaching, 
collaborative initiatives that would improve this important area of policy. Such 
initiatives could include the establishment of a joint NPDI fund for disarmament 
education, which could be hosted by the UN University in Japan and to which 
all ten NPDI members could contribute. The fund could generate research that 
encourages well-informed, leading-edge thinking on a range of nonproliferation 
and disarmament challenges, including the thorny issues of how stability and 
mutual restraint can be achieved in an Asia-centric nuclear order, and the impact 
of cross-domain threats (such as conventional, cyber and space weapons) on 
disarmament dynamics. Another worthwhile idea would be for the coalition to 
sponsor an annual international disarmament forum, hosted in a different NPDI 
capital each year, with the goal of attracting leading scholars and practitioners to 
address disarmament gridlocks. This part of the coalition’s agenda urgently needs 
fresh input, and preferably before the 2014 NPT PrepCom.
Changing course: the NPDI coalition as dialogue facilitators
Despite these criticisms, the NPDI could still make an important contribution in the 
lead-up to the 2015 Review Conference. For this to happen, two major changes 
are needed. First, NPDI members need to be more transparent about the roles that 
extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing play in their security policies. 
Second, the coalition needs to adapt its agenda to take into account recent 
events and changing strategic realities, focusing primarily on promoting candid 
and well-informed debate on nuclear weapons and disarmament dynamics in a 
world of rising tensions and growing uncertainties.21 Admittedly, this would be a 
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dramatic change in direction, and could risk alienating the three NPDI members 
that enjoy the strongest non-nuclear credentials (Chile, Mexico and UAE). But 
if a diplomatic strategy can be found to keep the group united through this 
transition, the NPDI would fulfil the critical and underappreciated role of clarifying 
the strategic challenges associated with disarmament. This would draw on the 
strengths of its members, close the credibility gap, and provide the NPDI with a 
role and function that would make an important and genuine contribution to the 
nonproliferation regime.
To begin this process, the NPDI members could bring together serving members of 
their defence and foreign affairs establishments to discuss disarmament challenges 
from strategic and political perspectives, in the context of their own deterrence 
relationships and recent developments affecting regional and international security. 
As part of this initiative, they could offer a platform to strategic thinkers in academic 
and think tank communities to prise open some of the wider debates about the 
relationship between stability and disarmament, especially in a multipolar world in 
which power shifts and cross-domain threats and vulnerabilities are heightening 
insecurities. This includes developments in—and relationships between—
precision-guided conventional weapons, missile defence, space weaponisation 
and cyberwar, as well as strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Once these 
debates are underway domestically, and among NPDI partners, the next step would 
be for the NPDI to sponsor a series of discussions on these issues on the sidelines 
of the 2014 NPT PrepCom and 2015 Review Conference.
Although at first sight this might appear to be an abstract exercise, it would serve 
an important practical purpose by bringing together practitioners and experts who 
usually operate in separate spheres, helping them to appreciate the full range of 
political and strategic dilemmas and the interconnectedness of deterrence, arms 
control, nonproliferation and disarmament. It would encourage those expressing 
various degrees of resistance to nuclear disarmament to consider the strategic role 
that the NPT has played in the past, the pressure it’s under today, and the impact 
that national security policy choices are having on the treaty’s future prospects. 
Equally, it would encourage those expressing various degrees of support for 
nuclear disarmament to appreciate the real and immense difficulties involved in 
disarmament, including the many challenges of maintaining order and stability 
on the road to nuclear elimination, especially as power shifts eastwards, and the 
challenge of preventing major conventional war in a world without nuclear weapons.
Bringing these groups together in an international forum in frank and open dialogue, 
rather than perpetuating the current situation, in which they don’t engage or they 
talk past each other, is an important service that NPDI members could provide to 
the international community.
An Australian-led regional dialogue
Following the September election, a window of opportunity will open for Australia to 
lead a new non-proliferation and disarmament dialogue that could help strengthen 
the NPDI agenda and bolster the NPT. Canberra’s geostrategic position, long 
record of NPT advocacy, and efforts to turn regional security challenges into 
opportunities for closer cooperation, put it in a special position to provide this 
leadership. Moreover, Australia’s experience of handling its close alliance with 
the United States, including the nuclear umbrella, would be a help rather than a 
hindrance in this context, especially if the focus of the dialogue is on Asia–Pacific 
non-proliferation and disarmament challenges, including the difficult issues of 
nuclear brinkmanship, extended nuclear deterrence, and missile defence. Interest in 
this initiative among states in the region is likely to be strong, especially in the wake 
of the North Korea crisis, concerns over further proliferation, and the international 
community’s desire to avoid further descent into Asian nuclear disorder.  
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The initiative could begin with a series of track 1.5 discussions, drawing on the 
expertise of a wide range of non-proliferation and disarmament practitioners and 
analysts from the Asia–Pacific. The first gathering could take place in Canberra 
later this year, leading to a series of meetings in capitals across the wider region, 
and to the production of two final reports. The first report could be presented to the 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in late 2014, setting out 
fresh ideas for Australia’s non-proliferation and disarmament diplomacy, identifying 
opportunities for Australia to enhance its regional role. The second report could be 
presented to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, also in late 2014, setting 
out priority issues and proposals for Australia and its NPDI partners to debate at the 
2015 Review Conference and UN First Committee, and a series of forward-looking 
proposals around which NPDI could begin to develop a new agenda beyond 2015. 
Conclusion
Frank dialogue is unlikely to help build consensus at the 2015 NPT Review 
Conference (it might even have the opposite effect), but the truth is that there’s 
little value in reaching superficial agreements that will later be reneged upon 
anyway.22 Taking into account the ambiguous nuclear status of its members, 
and an international environment that’s not conducive to effective disarmament 
diplomacy, the NPDI would have more to offer if it switched its focus from a 
traditional bridge-building role to addressing the difficult strategic uncertainties 
that are dissipating disarmament momentum. States have failed to discuss these 
challenges honestly and openly in the past either in domestic political forums or 
at NPT meetings. As a result, divided constituencies have had little chance of fully 
appreciating perspectives that differ from their own. This is a major obstacle to 
progress, so, while there are risks involved in pursuing this agenda, those risks are 
worth taking. Furthermore, the pace of change in the international system makes 
the need for frank and well-informed dialogue more pressing than ever.
Appendix: Summary of NPT Review Conference outcomes, 1975 to 2010
NPT meeting Outcome Explanation
1975 RevCon Consensus final 
document agreed
NAM wanted to support NPT as only treaty 
committing NWS to negotiate on disarmament
1980 RevCon No consensus North–South disagreements over the wording 
of the CTBT and US–European disagreements 
over Carter administration’s efforts to restrict 
reprocessing and fast-breeder reactors
1985 RevCon Consensus final 
document
Deep divisions over disarmament handled via a 
procedural device
1990 RevCon No consensus Divisions over disarmament between NWS and 
NAM proved too deep for a procedural fix
1995 Review & 
Extension Conference
Treaty indefinitely 
extended
Review process 
strengthened (annual 
PrepComs to discuss 
substance for three 
years leading up to 
RevCons)
Three ‘decision 
documents’, including 
yardsticks for progress 
in disarmament—
CTBT, FMCT, nuclear 
reductions and ultimate 
elimination
End of Cold War had led to deep reductions by 
US and Russia
CTBT negotiations were underway in Vienna
1997 PrepCom Consensus document Parties agreed next RevCon would have special 
focus on nuclear disarmament
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1998 PrepCom No consensus Disagreements over purpose of PrepCom: to 
focus on next RevCon or on more immediate 
challenges
1999 PrepCom No consensus More disagreements over PrepCom purpose
2000 RevCon Final document and ‘13 
steps’—an expanded 
disarmament action plan 
and set of principles, 
including an unequivocal 
undertaking by the 
NWS to accomplish the 
total elimination of their 
nuclear arsenals, leading 
to disarmament
Backtracking on the 
strengthened review 
process agreed to in 
1995—no need for a 
consensus documents 
in first two PrepCom 
sessions, only factual 
summaries
New Agenda Coalition active in building bridge 
between NWS and NAM
NWS and European Union states agreed on joint 
documents on disarmament
Conference on Disarmament was stalemated 
over starting negotiations on an FMCT—RevCon 
‘only game in town’
1998 nuclear tests in India and Pakistan 
increased nuclear fears
2002 PrepCom Factual summary only Deep divisions over missile defence, NWS 
backtracking over 13 steps
Concern over US post-9/11 focus on 
nonproliferation and seeming disregard for 
disarmament
2003 PrepCom Factual summary only More deep divisions over the same issues
Questions from NAM over whether the 1995 
extension decision was now voided
Disagreement over how to respond to North 
Korea’s NPT withdrawal
2004 PrepCom No consensus Deep divisions between NWS and NAM
New Agenda Coalition also internally divided
2005 RevCon No consensus
Agenda not even agreed 
until day 14
Negotiations deadlocked
Iran filibustered over the agenda
Lack of joint statement from the P5
US and France backtracked on 2000 
commitments
Egypt inflexible over the Middle East WMD Free 
Zone negotiations
NAM refusal to agree to any document that did 
not advance disarmament beyond 13 steps
2007 PrepCom Factual summary only Atmosphere more positive—parties determined 
to avoid a repeat of 2005
2008 PrepCom Factual summary only No need for consensus, plus sense that parties 
keeping their powder dry until 2009
2009 PrepCom Consensus document Assisted by the Obama administration’s Prague 
speech and commitment to disarmament
2010 RevCon Consensus final 
document and plan of 
action
Conference president 
developed new 
procedural fix whereby 
only forward-looking 
elements in the final 
document need to be 
agreed by consensus
Obama administration took positive approach
Egypt kept Iran in line
Agenda satisfied most parties by developing 
three equally balanced plans of action for 
nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and 
peaceful uses.
FMCT = Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; PrepCom = preparatory committee; RevCon = review conference
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Acronyms and abbreviations
CTBT  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
FMCT  Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
NAM  Non-Aligned Movement
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO  non-government organisation
NPDI  Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative
NPT  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NNWS  non-nuclear-weapon state/s
NWS  nuclear-weapon state/s
P5  permanent members of UN Security Council
PrepCom NPT review conference preparatory committee
RevCon NPT review conference
WMD  weapons of mass destruction
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